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TAX NOTES
INCOME TAXES: DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL
FEES UNDER § 212(3)
A husband incurred an attorney fee arising from an uncontested
divorce. At least seventy percent of the fee represented a proper allocation to services and advice given in connection with the tax consequences
flowing from the divorce.' Primarily, the attorney directed his professional efforts to making sure, so far as possible, that the substantial
support payments would constitute taxable alimony to the wife and
thereby be deductible by the husband.' The husband contended that the
portion of the attorney fee pertaining solely to services and advice relating to his tax matters should be deductible pursuant to § 212(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 Held, by the Court of Claims,
§ 212(3) permits a deduction for legal expenses incurred in connection
with the determination, collection or refund of any tax, whether or not
contested by the government. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366
(Ct. Cl. 1964).
The affluent tax conscious husband obtaining a divorce has long been
searching for a means of obtaining a tax deduction for tax advice expenditures incurred in connection with the divorce in order to soften the
burden. 4 The Court of Claims, in the face of conflicting views, 4a has
always adhered to the principle that legal fees paid for consultation and
1. The tax deduction involved over $150,000 annually. In the absence of evidence indicating the allocation was in bad faith or lacking in reality, the allocation should be accepted.
Bryant Heater Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1956); Maine Steel, Inc. v.
United States, 174 F. Supp. 702 (D. Me. 1959); Anita M. Baldwin, 10 B.T.A. 1198 (1928);
Samuel S. Schahet, 28 Tax Ct. Mem. 213 (1959); International Trading Co., 27 Tax Ct.
Mem. 447 (1958).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 215.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the
production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection or refund of any tax. (Emphasis added.)
4. United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39
(1963); United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646
(8th Cir. 1952).
4a. The Tax Court has repeatedly refused to permit the husband any deduction for
attorney fees incurred in connection with divorce proceedings. Charlotte M. Douglas, 33
T.C. 349 (1959); James A. Walsh, 28 T.C. 1274 (1957). The courts of appeals have been
in conflict. Compare Owens v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959); Bowers v.
Commissioner, 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957) with Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1958).
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advice in tax matters are properly deductible from gross income even
though arising in connection with a divorce settlement agreement.' In
the notable Gilmore decision, the Supreme Court established the principle that legal expenses generated by a separation or divorce decree are
not deductible under § 212(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.6
But in Gilmore the court emphasized its decision was founded on
§ 212(2), not § 212(3).' Therefore, Gilmore,8 did not controvene the

prior posture of the Court of Claims.
There are no express provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of

1954 referring specifically to the matter of deductibility of legal or other
professional fees. Such expenditures, if deductible at all, must qualify
as a business expense under § 162(a),9 or, in the case of an individual
taxpayer, under § 21220 Admittedly dissolusion of the marital affinity
will involve not only the severence of the personal relationship but the
division of property and payment of money as well. As a result, the legal
services to be rendered will involve not only a personal element but will

also relate to financial matters and production of income." Presumably,
one phase of the complex problem has been permanently resolved by
Gilmore.12 The test of deductibility under § 212 (2) is determined by the
origin or source of the claim, not its effect on the income producing property.'5 Fees incurred for defending against a claim based on a marital
relation will no longer be deductible under § 212(2) on the theory that
5. Davis v. United States, 152 Ct. CI. 805, 287 F.2d 168 (1961). On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. United States v. Davis,
370 U.S. 65 (1962). However, in Davis, the court did not review the question involved
here. The Supreme Court specifically refrained from intimating any opinion on the issue
except to state that "as to the deduction of the wife's fees, we read the statute, if applicable
to this type of tax expense, to include only the expenses of the taxpayer himself and not
those of his wife."
6. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). See note 3 for full text of § 212.
7. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
8. Ibid.
9. As being an "ordinary and necessary expense paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business."
10. This section provides for the so-called "non-business expense" deduction. Although
a legal fee may satisfy the requirements of § 162 or § 212, deductibility is still subject to
the non-deductibility provisions of §§ 261-273. Thus, a legal fee constituting a capital
expenditure may not be deducted. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263(a).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1958) expressly provides, "Generally, attorney fees
and other costs paid in connection with a divorce, separation or decree of support are not
deductible by either the husband or the wife." Unfortunately, the use of the qualifying term
"generally" has in effect left the matter to a case by case resolution in the courts.
12. Prior to Gilmore numerous decisions allowed a deduction for legal fees incurred
to "conserve" or "protect" a taxpayer's income producing property from his wife's adverse
marital claims. Owens v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959); Bowers v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957); Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952);
McMurtry v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 114 (Ct. Cl. 1955). Contra, Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958).
13. This rule precludes a taxpayer from obtaining a deduction for fees incurred in
protecting against a wife's community property claims. The claims have been held to be
personal--arising out of the marriage relations, "for no such property could have existed but
for the marriage relationship." United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 52 (1963). See, Note,
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the claim is one directly jeopardizing the income producing property. 4
On the other hand, § 212(3) expressly authorizes a deduction for expenses incurred in connection with the determination, collection or refund
of any tax."5 It is significant that Congress has described § 212(3) as
being "designed to permit the deduction by an individual of legal and
other expenses paid or incurred in connection with a contested tax liability. Any expenses incurred in contesting any liability . . .will be de-

ductible."' 6 As a result of this pronouncement, the government haj repeatedly contended that § 212(3) was intended to apply only to actual
contested tax liabilities-not for expenses incident to the determination
of a tax liability prior to the time it becomes contested. 17 Two years ago,
the Internal Revenue attempted to implement its interpretation of
§ 212(3) by denying a taxpayer's deduction for fees incurred in securing
an income tax ruling.'" Taxpayers had deducted their allocale share of
the accountants fee and the commissioner disallowed it. The commissioner
Income Tax-Deductibility of Legal Fees Incurred Defending Income Producing Property
in a Divorce Action, 18 U. MiAm- L. REv. 225 (1963).
14. See supra note 4. In both the Gilmore and Patrick cases, the taxpayer sought to
justify the deduction of legal fees as having been incurred to conserve income producing
property under § 212(2). In neither case was the deduction sought under § 212(1) as being
incurred for the production or collection of income. The facts of Gilmore were not amenable
to such an argument. Deduction under § 212(1) is available only when expenses are incurred
to create income. The deduction cannot be predicated on "production" when only liabilities
or allowable deductions are reduced. Hunter v. United States, 219 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1955);
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(m) (1957). By contrast, Patrick involved fees incurred to arrange a
reshuffling and purchase of property interests for the purposes of satisfying the wife's marital
claims. If such transfers at divorce were currently productive of income, either as taxable
divisions of property between vested owners or as taxable transfers under Davis, the fees
incurred to produce such income should be currently deductible under § 212(1). See Treas.
Reg. § 1.212-1(b); § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1958). The actual result in Patrick is not necessarily
contrary. The disallowance of the legal fees can be explained by the taxpayer's failure to
argue for deductibility under § 212(1), having instead unsuccessfully rested his case on
the provisions of § 212(2).
15. See Note 3 for full text of § 212.
16. H. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 29 (1954). (Emphasis added.) The remarks
of the Senate Finance Committee were almost identical. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 218 (1954).
17. The committee reports made clear that § 212(3) was primarily designed to change
the rule established in Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952) which had held that
legal fees paid in connection with the litigation of a gift tax liability were not deductible
since it was a gift tax, rather than an income tax, that was being contested. The amendment was intended to allow a deduction for legal expenses incurred in connection with the
determination, collection or refund of any tax.
18. Kaufman v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963). Three stockholders
had decided it would be advantageous to themselves and their estates to make a change in
their stockholdings. An agreement was entered into with American Investment Company,
a corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange, under which Kaufman and his associates would receive common and preferred stock in exchange for the stock of their commerce loan company. After executing the agreement an accounting firm was employed to
explore its tax consequences and to prepare any necessary data and information needed to
obtain a tax ruling on whether or not the transfer of stock would be tax free. The accounting firm submitted a bill in the amount of approximately $8,600 of which $7,600 was
applicable to the determination of the tax liability under the agreement for the exchange
of stock. The accountants took no part in drafting the exchange agreement or in the negotiation of its terms.
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would only recognize as deductible those expenses incurred where the
activities are in connection with the determination, collection or refund of
a tax such as those involved in the preparation of a tax return or the
determination or contesting of the extent of the taxpayers liability or
for a return under audit. This view precluded the deduction for any expenses incident to a determination of a tax liability prior to the time
when it becomes contested. The federal court rejected the commissioner's
argument. Where the legislative history is not in accord with the clear
meaning of the words used in the act itself, the court is bound by the
clear and commonly understood meaning of the act.19 Sec. 212 (3) is clear
when it provides, "in connection with the determination ...

of any tax."

"Determination" is only one phase of a tax controversy. Since the purpose of the taxpayer was to determine a question of tax liability, the
expenses allocable to such determination must be deductible under
§ 212(3).
It is significant that the Treasury regulations do not try to limit
deductibility of expenses incurred for employment of tax counsel to only
those instances involving a contest of a tax liability or the preparation
of a tax return. 0 Indeed, the Treasury regulations expressly permit the
deduction of expenses paid or incurred for tax counsel.1 Similarly, the
Treasury regulations also provide for the deduction of fees paid to investment counsel.' Obviously, a taxpayer does not employ investment counsel after he has made his investments. Similarly, a taxpayer should not
be limited in his deduction of expenses for tax counsel to the time when
he discovers the tax consequences of circumstances which have already
transpired. One of the fundamental purposes of the taxpayer in obtaining tax counsel is to avoid tax contests, not create them.23
There is a suggestion in the committee reports that the problem was
anticipated by the American Bar Association Section on Taxation. The
Association entered an appearance at the Senate hearings and requested
that the language of the house committee be modified by adding the word
"computation" before the word "determination" in order to make it clear
that deductions with respect to taxes would not be limited to contested
liabilities.24 Unfortunately, the Senate Committee on Finance did not
19. Id. at 813.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957) provides:
(1) Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the tax determination, collection, or refund of any tax, whether the taxing authority be Federal,
State, or municipal, and whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, or any
other tax, are deductible. Thus, expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer for tax
counsel or expenses paid or incurred in connection with the preparation of his tax
returns or in connection with any proceedings involved in determining the extent
of tax liability or in contesting his tax liability are deductible. (Emphasis added.)
21. Ibid.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(g) (1957).
23. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
24. 1 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 at 487:

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIX

adopt this suggestion. However, the significance of their failure to adhere
to the suggestion is of dubious weight."
The results of Carpenterare consistent with the findings in Gilmore
and Patrick.26 While the "origin test" is applicable to deductibility of an
expense incurred for the management, conservation or maintenance of
property held for the production of income, the emphasis in § 212(3) is
on the expenditure made in connection with the determination of the tax
liability. As a result, the "origin" or "source" of the legal expense incurred is from the desire to determine the tax liability, not the achievement of results in the personal divorce litigation. In view of this, the
fees incurred can only be in connection with the determination of a tax
affecting the taxpayer's income under § 212(3). In Davis, the Supreme
Court denied the deduction for attorney fees paid by the taxpayer for
his former wife's attorney since they were not in connection with the
determination, collection or refund of his tax. This is in accord with the
general principle that a taxpayer cannot claim a deduction for payment
of expenses of another.2 7
It is understandable that taxpayers are vitally interested in whether
legal and other professional fees are deductible for federal income tax
purposes. With our present high tax rate structure the ultimate burden of
While the language of section 212 by itself would appear not to present any particular problems, the language of the committee report on page A59 does raise a
new problem with respect to the language of the bill. The language of the committee
report appears to confine expenses in connection with tax matters to contested tax
liabilities under paragraph (3) of section 212. Since a specific provision ordinarily
controls a general provision, this might have the effect of limiting deductions with
respect to all taxes, including even income taxes, to contested matters. It is believed
that this result was not intended.
This problem might be eliminated by adding the word "computation" before
"determination" in section 212(3). In any event, the Senate Finance Committee
report should clarify the point that deductions with respect to taxes are not hereafter to be confined to contested taxes.
25. Attempts to use statements submitted to a congressional committee at a hearing
as evidence of congressional intent points up the general rule that statements by witnesses
before a congressional committee by those seeking enactmefnt of particular legislation is not
to be considered in arriving at the intention of Congress. Thomas v. S.B. Vandergrift & Co.,
162 Fed. 645 (3d Cir. 1908); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Duffy, 295 Fed. 881 (D.N.J.
1924), aff'd, 3 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1925), aff'd, 272 U.S. 613 (1926). Even statements made
by Congressmen during debates in Congress are unreliable in arriving at the intention of
Congress. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Lapina v. Williams,
232 U.S. 78 (1914); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that in appropriate instances statements of witnesses who are proponents of particular legislation may be helpful in understanding the
enactments which finally emerge in respect to the subject matter. United States v. Ogilvie
Hardware Co., 330 U.S. 709 (1947).
26. Discussed in text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
27. Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); McGruder v. Supplee,
316 U.S. 394 (1942); Lewis v. Comm'r, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958). Moreover, such payment may cause the wife to lose a deduction that she might otherwise have had available
if she made her own payment, although, arguably, the husband's payment should constitute
an indirect payment by the wife so as to entitle her to any deduction she would have otherwise merited by her own payment.
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the fees is profoundly affected by the question of deductibility. However,
although Carpenterestablishes that application of § 212(3) will not be
limited only to expenditures incurred in the contesting of a tax liability,
no standard is suggested as to how remote the legal expenditure may
be in relation to the anticipated tax liability. The decision could be construed to permit an individual taxpayer to deduct counsel fees paid for
the general planning of his holdings to minimize income, estate or gift
taxes in future years, or even more remotely, for arranging marital or
family affairs with a view to tax minimization in the future. Since these
expenditures clearly fall outside the purview of § 212(1) and (2) as
being purely personal, it would seem advisable to require that a clear
congressional intent be manifested before permitting deductions of all
expenditures which may be remotely connected with a tax liability. Certainly, the enactment of § 212(3) was not intended to encompass fees
incurred for the advice of tax counsel with respect to every intra-family
disposition of property, whether by ordinary gift, trust, insurance policy
or by will. Many such dispositions are prompted, at least in part, by
advice of tax counsel. Many specialists in the field of tax law devote
themselves almost entirely to tax planning for gifts and estates. Not
every legal fee attributable to the execution of a gift, trust deed, insurance
policy, or will should be properly claimed to be attributable in part to
the tax planning involved in the drafting of the instrument. This would
be going too far. Obviously, a meaningful standard is necessary to provide the taxpayer a reasonable opportunity to predict accurately the tax
consequences of deducting the fees incurred. Perhaps the approach of
Gilmore and Patrick could be utilized-that is, where the incurrence of
the expense originates for the substantial purpose of determining tax
liability a deduction should be allowed. While the advisor cannot resolve
the problem, a lesson can be derived from the cases. Clearly, the practitioner who is aware of the difficulties lying ahead can perform a valuable
service by maintaining careful records of the services he performs. In
this way, his clients will be able to make any allocation of his fees which
may later become necessary in order to segregate the deductible portion
from that which cannot be deducted.
HERBERT BUCHWALD

